Sybil attack is considered one of the most damaged attack that menace structured p2p overlay networks. It's the most sophisticated node active, used for a variety of illicit activities. A key requirement for these activities is the ability of such malicious user to generate a huge number of node identifiers and possibly choose some of them in order to disrupt availability and integrity in such systems. This paper highlights the problem of Sybil attack and presents a Sybil tracking process to deal with such problem.
Introduction
Structured p2p overlay networks have recently emerged as good candidate infrastructure for building novel largescale and robust Internet applications in which participating peers share-computing resources as equals. In the past, various systems have been proposed such as Chord, Kademlia, Pastry, and probably more are to co me [1] .
These overlay networks are distributed systems without any centralized control or hierarch ical organization, where the software running at each node is equivalent in functionality. A review of the features of recent p2p applications yields a long list: selection of nearby peers, redundant storage, efficient search/location of data items, data permanence or guarantees, hierarchical naming, t rust, authentication, and anonymity. However, these systems are vulnerable to malicious nodes called Sybil.
In such systems, before join ing the network, every peer must usually g enerate a user identifier. This identifier uniquely identify node in the overlay. However, the assignment of IDs is usually not controlled enough since there is no barriers to join the system. Users are free to join o r leave the network at any time. Th is allows malicious users to perform d ifferent types of attacks against the overlay such as Sybil attack. In this attack, a single user create mult iple fake identities and pretends to be multip le, d istinct physical node in the system. Sybil attack is considered between the most difficu lt and challenging attacks that plague current structured p2p overlay networks. A malicious node may try to break the routing system, or block access to information by impeding queries, or part ition the network.
In this paper, we are interested in tracking and mit igating the use of mass Sybil identities by malicious users. We argue that the main goal of these malicious nodes is to increase the power of the attacker by amassing links to honest users, thus integrating their identifiers into the routing table o f other peers. There is therefore the need to exp lore other mit igation strategies that can be used in combination with disinfection efforts to attenuate the threat of the Sybil nodes.
The rest of the paper is organized as fo llows. Section II presents the related works. In Sect ion III, we describe our proposed defense called Sybil tracking process. In Section VI, we give detail about the simu lation setup and the performance measures we used to assess the effectiveness of our mit igation strategy. Section V concludes.
Related Work
Structured p2p systems have shown to be notoriously difficult to protect against Sybil attacks. Various reports have been published that discuss and describes the various proposed defenses . In this section, we present an overview of techniques reported in the literature for making DHT-based systems resistant to Sybil attack.
Haribabu and Hota [2] have proposed a technique based on resource testing. The goal is to attempt to determine if a nu mber of identities possess fewer resources than would be expected if they were independent. It utilizes puzzle methods that exploit co mmun ication, storage or computational resource constraints of the participating. In these puzzles, the verifier sends a large random value to every other identity it wants to verify. These identities must then compute the solution within a constrained amount of time. If an entity has more than one identity it will fail to compute the solution within this time.
Bazzi and Kon jevod [3] have proposed a solution wherein every identity is issued a geometric cert ificate by a set of beacons nodes in the network. When a node needs to join the network, it has to present the required certificates fro m beacons. Dinger and Hartenstein [4] proposed an ID based identity registration procedure called selfregistration where an entity calculates its ID by apply ing a hash function on its IP address and port number. Finally, it registers the IP with 'r' nodes in the system.
In SybilGuard [5] , authors have proposed a distributed algorith m to limit the entry of Sybil identities into a social network, exp loit ing the fact that there are very few trust edges between an honest and a Sybil group in a social network. They have designed a protocol in which the verification of a new entry into the network is done by intersection of random routes. SybilInfer [6] offers a decentralized protocol to guard the network against Sybil attacks explo iting the fact that a Sybil attack would interfere with the fast mixing property of social networks.
Yothi and Janakiram [7] have proposed a Sybil monitor associated with every network node to oversee each and every transaction of a node. The given SyMon prevents a Sybil node fro m targeting honest nodes by moderating the transactions involving the concerned node.
Sybil Tracking
Sybil tracking is the process of detecting Sybil attacks performed by malicious nodes, notifying those, and also isolate them. In this section, we mainly concentrate on three steps: Sybil detection, Sybil notificat ion, and Sybil node isolation.
Sybil Detection
The main idea of the Sybil detection is to introduce mon itoring peers within the overlay, the monitors, which are all controlled by one entity, the coordinator. Positioned in a strategic way, the monitors allow us to gain fu ll control over a zone of the overlay. The mon itor can supervise the traffic of suspicious nodes and its neighbors. We use the Sybil attack to infiltrate the overlay and observe the communication between peers to get a better understanding of it.
Detection Suspicious nodes
The aim here is to infilt rate the overlay with few nu mber of monitor nodes, which seek to detect suspicious nodes by inserting themselves in the neighbors of honest user. For this, we need to introduce monitors and make them known, such that their presence is reflected in the routing table of other peers.
The coordinator is able to create thousands of monitors on one single physic al machine. We have developed an implementation of such coordinator that is able to create detectors and specify for each of them a specific zone to connect to. We divided the overlay into zones to achieve accuracy and obtain a more global view. A zone is specified by x higher order b its (prefix) of the Id space that is common among all peers. We introduce detectors into the network; the first n bits are different (prefix of each zone) and the following bits are fixed, they are the signatures of our detectors.
To infiltrate the network and detect suspicious peers the monitor M is imp lemented in the following steps. First, M sends hello message to the neighbor peers in order to poison their routing tables with entries that point our monitors. The peer that receive hello message will add the detector to their routing table. Second, M sends FIND_NODE o r FIND_ VA LUE message to locate some random Ids in the monitored zone. We must ensure that random node Ids or random content ids does not exist in the Id space. The normal behavior is to reply with the nearest nodes to the queried Id. However, the attacker puts its Id in the response and claims he is the owner of the queried Id. By checking who priv ileges the ownership of those non -existent Ids, we can identify suspicious nodes. Any node coming to us with those content Ids will be marked suspicious. Finally, M gathers the Ids of all suspicious nodes detected and report results to the coordinator.
Local monitoring
This module detects various Sybil attacks against structured p2p overlay networks and verdicts malicious nodes involved in such attacks. Local monitoring starts immed iately after the infiltrat ion process and the completion of neighbor discovery process. The in filtrated node monitors the messages going in and out o f suspicious nodes and its neighbors.
Infiltration process
In order to exp lore the suspicious node detected by the detection process, we place a mon itor peer within. The key idea in this is to make monitors locally to the target ID o f suspicious node and its neighbors. This enables us to overhear all the co mmunication. At the start of the infiltrat ion process, the monitor node introduces itself in the overlay in the follo wing two steps:
Step1: The coordinator initiates and places the monitor node next to t he target node (suspicious node) in the ID space.
Step2: Neighbor discovery: A neighbor of a node, M, is any node that lies within the transmission range of M. As soon as a monitor node M is infiltrated, it sends a hello message. Any node that receives the message and sends a reply back to M within a predefined time out will be added to its neighbor list.
Monitoring process
For a node M to be able to monitor a node S. M must be a neighbor of both S and the neighbors of S. In such case, M monitors all the co mmunicat ion of S and its neighbors. It captures information for each message sent and received fro m Ns to S in the fo llo wing two steps:
Step1: When suspicious peer S receives a request fro m the requester peer, it replies with monitor peer address because according to suspicious peer routing table, M is one of the closest peers to the requested ID.
Step2: When the requester peer learns about the monitor peer, it sends the same request. Thus, the monitor receives a copy of all messages for the address space attributed to the suspicious peer S.
Detecting process
In general, the act ivities underly ing a large set of Sybil attacks in structured p2p overlay networks are comp rised of the following actions performed by Sybil identities. First, Sybil nodes can drop all the messages received fro m its neighboring nodes, thereby disrupting the network message routing for lookup process as well as isolating some part of the network. Second, they can delay all the messages by forwarding lookup to incorrect or non -existent peer. Thus it will fail to lookup correct peer by forwarding requests to malicious peers. Finally, they can send false responses to the messages it receives in order to propagate its own propaganda or send malicious files. Thus it will strategically spread the target files in the whole network.
After the description of different kind of Sybil attacks under consideration, a monitor peer can invoke the verification protocol to determine the Sybil nodes: 
Sybil Notifications and Isolation
Detection process is only the first step towards protecting the structured p2p overlay networks against Sybil attacks. The Sybil notificat ion is used to propagate the notification of detected Sybil to the neighbors and takes the appropriate action to isolate them fro m the overlay. To achieve the notification and isolation process a monitor node M executes the following actions. First, M sends to each neighbor of S an authenticated alert message in the following form: (IDm, IDs, HM, M 's public key). Second, each neighbor of S who receives the alert message achieve this three actions: it verifies the authentication of the alert message, marks S as a Sybil node and stores the message in an alert buffer to prevent other nodes to accept or forward any message fro m and to S until S will be removed fro m the overlay. Finally, M proceed to the isolation process. It redirect all messages coming to S to other nodes, drops all messages forwarded by S, and removes S fro m its neighbor list.
Evaluati on
For the evaluation, we use the PeerfactSim.Ko m [8] simu lator to simulate the chord protocol, indiv idually without any protection, and with the approach proposed in the last sect ion. We use a network with a fixed size (N=500 nodes) and fixed rate o f Sybil nodes (m=0,2%). We use two scenarios; in the first we use a network without any protection. However, in the second we activate the Sybil detection process. We distribute the node s over a varied number of zones 0, 2, 4 and 8 to determine the number of monitors to detect and mit igate Sybil nodes. Each node generates and publishes their data using an exponential random distribution each 60 seconds during the first interval rate. Besides, in the second interval time each node performs a lookup each 60 seconds after the stabilization process is over. When a Sybil nodes infiltrate the network and intercept a request, it can drop, delay or send false response to the requester peer. Fig. 2 shows the time event of the attack without Sybil detection process and the attack with Sybil detection process respectively. Fig. 3 .a depicts the evolution of the number of monitored peers vs the evo lution of the number of suspicious peers for a 4 zones. However, Figure 3 .b depicts the evolution of the number of monitored peers vs the evolution of the number of detected Sybil peers. We can notice that the number of monitored peers grows rap idly over t he duration of the experiment, which due to the fact that the nu mber of connected peers to our monitor peers increases with the simulat ion time. Also, the number of detected suspicious peers and Sybil peers increases with the Sybil tracking process. The high level o f part icipating in the network, make such peers detected and tracked by our tracking process. Fig. 3 .b demonstrates that approximately 94% o f Sybil nodes are detected. We present next on Fig. 4 .a the evolution of the number of false negative en relat ion with the evolution of number of suspicious peers. It refers to a failure to detect Sybil peers that are present on a system. Fig. 4 .b demonstrates the evolution of the number of false positive en relation with the evolution of number of detected peers. It occurs when the detector mistakenly flags an honest peer as being infected.
In summary, the validation experiments show that our tracking process captures close to 98% of requests, 96% of operations and approximately 94% of Sybil nodes.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a Sybil attack. We have proved that this attack is one of the most dangerous attacks that plague current structured p2p overlay netwo rks. It is emp loyed to target hones t peers and hence subvert the system. It can drop all the messages received fro m its neighboring node, thereby disrupting the network message routing for lookup process as well as isolating some part of the network. It can delay all the messages by forward ing lookup to an incorrect or non-existent peer. Finally, it can send false responses to the requests it receives to propagate its own propaganda or send malicious file.
Also, we have proposed a Sybil t racking process, which based on three processes to det ect and attenuate Sybil nodes. The Sybil detection unit is responsible for detecting any kind of Sybil attack described above. The notification unit handles how to notify these attacks to its neighbors. Finally, the isolation process is responsible for isolating them fro m the overlay.
